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GRID MODERNIZATION AND ENERGY POVERTY
Shelley Welton*
Grid modernization holds the alluring promise of rationalizing
electricity pricing, saving consumers money, and improving
environmental quality all at the same time. Yet, we have seen only
limited and patchwork regulatory initiatives towards significant
grid modernization in the United States. Outside of a few leading
states, state energy regulators appear loath to embrace fullthroated versions of the project. This article argues that the underdiscussed problem of energy poverty in the United States is a
critical contributing factor in the gap between grid
modernization’s possibilities and our regulatory reality. Only by
explicitly understanding how the issues of grid modernization and
energy poverty intersect, and by coming up with creative ways to
address the challenges created, can regulators gain the comfort
they need to move forward with grid modernization reforms in the
face of rising inequality and substantial energy poverty. To get at
these connections, this Article utilizes a case study of New York
State’s grid modernization efforts. As part of these efforts,
regulators there have pursued an inclusive inquiry into how best to
manage the ways in which grid modernization might have
disparate impacts on lower-income consumers, producing some
important early-stage lessons for emerging modernization efforts
in other states.

* Thank you to participants in the symposium for their helpful feedback on these
ideas. Thanks as well to Kintéshia Scott and Meagan Diedolf for outstanding
research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
For those who care about efficiency and rationality, there is
much to want to fix in U.S. electricity law. Aging infrastructure,
nonsensical pricing structures, and worries over whether the grid
and its markets—as currently designed—can facilitate necessary
levels of renewable or carbon-free generation, are all pressing
concerns.1 Fortunately, technological solutions to these problems
abound, and companies peddling these wares are eager to engage
in the project of “grid modernization.”2 This modernization effort
may introduce into the grid a “smart meter” for every house,
capable of providing real-time information on electricity
consumption; a host of “smart appliances” to respond to this
information; storage systems capable of saving excess renewable
energy generation to be released at times of under-production,
including electric vehicles to act as grid batteries when not in use;
and a shift to “dynamic” pricing to incentivize consumers to utilize
1

See, e.g., Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in
the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141 (2016).
2
Some also use the term “smart grid” to describe a similar set of reforms. See
Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2013). MIT’s thorough study on the future of the electric
grid eschews any particular definition of “smart grid” in favor of defining the
project of grid modernization as “making the grid of the future more resilient,
secure, efficient and reliable amid a variety of emerging challenges.” MASS.
INST. TECH. (MIT), THE FUTURE OF THE GRID: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MIT
STUDY 20 (2011).
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technologies to better manage the timing of their electricity
demand.3
For those who care about justice, current electricity governance
also leaves much to be desired. In 2015, fourteen million U.S.
households had unpaid utility bills, and 2.2 million had service
disconnected.4 That means around 14% of U.S. households are
either actively without energy services, or in danger of losing them
imminently.5 Many of these families, and many others who
manage to pay their bills on time but sacrifice other basic
necessities to do so, spend an exorbitant and unsustainable portion
of their monthly earnings on obtaining energy supplies, causing
them to experience “energy poverty.”6 To add insult to injury,
many of these same families are likely to be more severely harmed
than wealthier Americans by the effects of climate change—
another inconvenient byproduct of our current energy
infrastructure.7

3

See Eisen, supra note 2, at 19. Grid modernization also involves many
larger-scale solutions, typically implemented or constructed by utilities. See
infra Part I.
4
Tony Gerard Reames, Targeting Energy Justice: Exploring Spatial,
Racial/Ethnic and Socioeconomic Disparities in Urban Residential Heating
Energy Efficiency, 97 ENERGY POL’Y 549, 549 (2016).
5
This number was obtained by dividing Reames’ figures on households
without energy services or behind on their utility bills, 16.2 million, by the U.S.
Census total number of U.S. households, 117 million. See QuickFacts, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/HSD410215/00 (last
visited Feb. 23, 2017).
6
See infra Part III.
7
See U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE CHANGE
IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES: THE THIRD NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT
12 (Jerry M. Melillo et al. eds., 2014), http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/report
(“Certain groups of people are more vulnerable to the range of climate change
related health impacts, including the elderly, children, the poor, and the sick.”);
see also GEO. MASON U. CTR. CLIMATE CHANGE COMMC’N, RACE, ETHNICITY
AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (2010).
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Descriptions of Americans opening their ovens to stay warm in
the winter8 appear a far cry from the cornucopia of technological
wonders described in the first paragraph of this Article. Perhaps in
part for this reason, grid modernization and energy poverty are
rarely discussed in the same conversation, much less in the same
sentence.9 Yet grid modernization—for all its anticipated
substantial long-term benefits—requires substantial short-term
spending, and carries both short- and long-term distributional
consequences. Most decisions on how to modernize both
infrastructure and regulatory frameworks are made by state
electricity regulators, “nearly all [of whom] feel pressure or the
desire to address the issue of affordability.10 For this reason, as the
project of grid modernization substantially advances in many
states, regulators no longer feel able to ignore its intersections with
energy poverty.
If fully carried out, the Department of Energy has suggested
that the project of grid modernization “may transform America as
much as the Internet has done, redefining every aspect of
electricity generation, distribution, and use.”11 For a long time, the
primary impediment to this transformation was technical—we
simply did not have the infrastructure necessary to reform energy
8

See, e.g., Deadly Dangers of Using the Stove for Heat, METRO. TENANTS
ORG. (Feb. 18, 2011, 11:13 AM), http://www.tenants-rights.org/deadly-dangersof-using-the-stove-for-heat/.
9
Although this measure is crude, one might also note that the two terms have
never appeared together in a single law review article archived on Westlaw (as
indicated by a January 2017 Westlaw search for the terms in the “Law Reviews
and Journals” database). Cf. Karen Bickerstaff et al., Introduction: Making
Sense of Energy Justice to ENERGY JUSTICE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE: SOCIAL
JUSTICE AND LOW-CARBON ENERGY 2 (Karen Bickerstaff et al. eds., 2013)
(“[E]nergy justice is one of the most critical, and yet least developed, concepts
associated with theories and practices of low-carbon transitions, and one that
must underpin a sustainable energy future.”).
10
See SEVERIN BORENSTEIN, THE REDISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF NONLINEAR ELECTRICITY PRICING 35 (Energy Institute at Haas, Working Paper No.
204R,
2011),
https://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/research/abstracts/abstract_wp204R.html
[hereinafter Borenstein, Non-Linear Electricity Pricing].
11
Eisen, supra note 2, at 6.
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pricing and integrate new technologies. Now, however—thanks in
large part to a significant amount of funding from the 2009
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act12—the necessary
technology is in place in much of the country.13
And yet, we have seen limited and patchwork regulatory
initiatives towards significant grid modernization.14 Outside of a
few leading states, state energy regulators appear loath to embrace
full-throated versions of the project. Consumers, too, have proven
wary about adopting putatively beneficial but unfamiliar energy
management technologies and strategies.15 In light of these
challenges, it seems clear that the major impediments to grid
modernization are now firmly within the social and regulatory
realms.16
Many others have made this same observation in recent years.17
They have propounded a list of hurdles holding us back from our
grid modernizing potential, including conservatism on the part of
utilities and regulators, challenges to utility profitability, concerns
over increasing consumers’ electric bill volatility, and privacy
concerns over the new mountains of consumption data that a
modern grid might produce.18 This symposium article aims to make
a modest addition to this conversation: In brief, it argues that the
12

See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5,
123 Stat. 115 (2009); Paul L. Joskow & Catherine D. Wolfram, Dynamic
Pricing of Electricity, 102 AM. ECON. REV. 381, 382 (2012) (“The American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) provided about $5.0 billion
for smart grid demonstration and technology deployment projects . . . .”).
13
See infra Part III.
14
Ahmad Faruqui, The Ethics of Dynamic Pricing, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 13, 18
(2010) (describing how some economists “believed that given the overwhelming
efficiency benefits that would flow from dynamic pricing, it was inevitable that
deployment of this optimal rate design would soon follow. But it did not.”).
15
See infra Part I.
16
Although, of course, it is difficult to establish “a clear and widely accepted
border between what is considered to be unquestionably technical and what is
recognized as unquestionably social.” MICHAEL CALLON ET AL., ACTING IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD: AN ESSAY ON TECHNICAL DEMOCRACY 25 (Graham
Burchell trans., MIT 2001).
17
See infra Section II.B.
18
See id.
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under-discussed problem of energy poverty in the United States is
a critical contributing factor in the gap between grid
modernization’s possibilities and our regulatory reality. Only by
explicitly understanding how these issues intersect, and by coming
up with creative ways to address the challenges created, can
regulators gain the comfort they need to move forward with grid
modernization reforms in the face of rising inequality and
substantial energy poverty.19
To get at these connections, this Article utilizes a case study of
New York State’s grid modernization efforts. New York is at the
forefront of efforts to dramatically redesign regulatory structures to
incentivize a modernized grid, through a process referred to as
“Reforming the Energy Vision” (REV).20 New York’s struggles
with the problem of energy poverty during its REV proceedings
illustrate the importance, challenges, and possibilities of explicitly
linking energy poverty to grid modernization efforts. In addition,
19

Michael Dworkin and Benjamin Sovacool have been doing path-breaking
work recently on defining the concept of “energy justice”—an endeavor
certainly relevant here. My discussion here resonates with their broader thesis:
“In sum, it is a mistake to talk about building infrastructure, improving energy
security, developing energy resources, forecasting future energy demand, or
conducting research on new technologies without first assessing energy justice:
asking what this energy is for, what values and moral frameworks ought to guide
us, and who benefits.” See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Michael H. Dworkin,
Energy Justice: Conceptual Insights and Practical Applications, 142 APPLIED
ENERGY 435, 441 (2015) [hereinafter Sovacool & Dworkin, Energy Justice]; see
also generally BENJAMIN K. SOVACOOL & MICHAEL H. DWORKIN, GLOBAL
ENERGY JUSTICE: PROBLEMS, PRINCIPLES, AND PRACTICES (2014). However, the
point here is less normative and more pragmatic: whether or not one thinks
energy justice should be a central concern in grid modernization is not of central
importance to me in this article. Instead, my argument is that simply as a matter
of fact, energy poverty does matter to state energy regulators, such that progress
on grid modernization depends on a willingness to consider its interaction with
energy poverty and an ability to articulate a nuanced understanding of their
tensions and synergies. Although the Author happens to share Dworkin and
Sovacool’s normative outlook, even those who do not, might appreciate the
more pragmatic version of the argument advanced here.
20
Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n in Regard to Reforming the Energy
Vision, No. 14-M-0101 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Apr. 25, 2014) [hereinafter
NYPSC Order Instituting Proceeding] (on file with author).
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the Article contends, New York’s experience foretells the
pressures that other states are likely to face as they proceed with
announced plans of similarly ambitious reform agendas.21
There is a significant risk that the challenges of grid
modernization may splinter groups working on causes frequently
cast together on the left: those struggling for a cleaner
environment, and those struggling against persistent and deepening
inequality. Such tensions have deep roots in the history of the
environmental justice movement.22 Fresh fractures are emerging in
21

Numerous states are just at the cusp of substantially overhauling their
outdated regulatory systems and grid infrastructure. See, e.g., Investigation by
the Department of Public Utilities on its own Motion into Modernization of the
Electric
Grid,
D.P.U.
12-76-B
(Mass.,
June
12,
2014),
http://web1.env.state.ma.us/DPU/FileRoomAPI/api/Attachments/Get/?path=1276%2FOrder_1276B.pdf; Nancy Lange et al., Building a Minnesota
Conversation on Grid Modernization with a Focus on Distribution Systems,
Minn.
Pub.
Utils.
Comm’n
(Minn.,
May
12,
2015),
http://mn.gov/puc/documents/pdf_files/
grid_modernization_5-12-2015.pdf; Commission’s Inclinations on the Future of
Hawaii’s Electric Utilities, In the Matter of Pub. Utilities Comm’n, 314 PUB.
UTILS. REPORTS 4TH 49 Exhibit A (Haw., Apr. 28, 2014),
http://puc.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2014/
04/Commissions-Inclinations.pdf; KRISTIN RALFF DOUGLAS, CUSTOMERS AS
GRID PARTICIPANTS: A FUNDAMENTALLY NEW ROLE FOR CUSTOMERS 3 (CAL.
PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, POL’Y & PLANNING DIV., May 15, 2013); Proposed
Decision on Order Instituting Rulemaking on the Commission’s Own Motion to
Conduct a Comprehensive Examination of Investor Owned Electric Utilities’
Residential Rate Structures, the Transition to Time Varying and Dynamic Rates,
and Other Statutory Obligations, Rulemaking 12-06-013 (Cal. Pub. Util.
Comm’n
Apr.
21,
2015)
[hereinafter
California
Rulemaking],
http://www.sandiegocan.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Revised-FinalDecision.pdf; Herman K. Trabish, Confidence in Collaboration: Rhode Island
Targets a Common Perspective on DER Values, UTIL. DIVE (Sept. 6, 2016),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/
confidence-in-collaboration-rhode-island-targets-a-common-perspective-on-d/42
5700/; Robert Walton, Maryland’s REV: How Utility Regulators Plan to Tackle
Business Model, DER Reforms, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 10, 2016),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/marylands-rev-how-utility-regulators-plan-totackle-business-model-der-r/427681/.
22
See CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & EILEEN GAUNA, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE: LAW, POLICY, & REGULATION 3–5 (Carolina Academic Press) (2002).
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many places across the country, as those in favor of policies
promoting rooftop solar confront suggestions that such policies
favor wealthier homeowners who can afford an appropriate perch
for such panels at the expense of other ratepayers.23
However, New York offers an antidote to such tales: there,
environmentalists and social justice organizers have staunchly
stood together, insisting in joint filings that their causes not be
parsed, nor pitted against one another.24 New York’s Commission
has listened, responding with a combination of enhanced bill
protections and more inclusive REV policies.25 In sum, the New
York example offers at least three important lessons to other states.
First, merely emphasizing the potential wonders of grid
modernization—including its potential economic upsides—is
unlikely to sufficiently allay the fears of those most desperately
struggling to maintain electricity under current policies. Separately
protecting the most vulnerable remains a priority for many
regulators and community members. Second, those worried about
energy poverty no longer want it addressed as a stand-alone issue,
considered apart from efforts towards renewable energy, new
technologies, or addressing climate change.26 Instead, there
emerged from New York’s proceedings an insistent refrain that
energy poverty concerns “should not be viewed in isolation from
the [REV] and related proceedings.”27 Third, process matters: New
23

Krysti Shallenberger, 10 Rooftop Solar Debates to Watch in 2017 and
Beyond, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/10rooftop-solar-debates-to-watch-in-2017-and-beyond/435070/ (In 2015, there
were 175 debates over rooftop solar policies in the U.S. . . . In 2016, there were
212. And this year, those numbers are expected to rise yet again . . . .). A
separate, similar debate exists in California over the advisability of addressing
climate change through “cap-and-trade” policies, which environmental justice
advocates suggest create hot-spots that harm low-income communities. See Lara
J. Cushing et al., A Preliminary Environmental Equity Assessment Of
California’s Cap-and-Trade Program, USCDORNSIFE (Sept. 2016),
http://dornsife.usc.edu/PERE/enviro-equity-CA-cap-trade.
24
See infra Part IV.
25
See id.
26
See id.
27
COMMENTS TO NEW YORK PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION STAFF REPORT,
PROCEEDING ON MOTION OF THE COMMISSION TO EXAMINE PROGRAMS TO
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York’s relatively successful integration of energy poverty
alleviation and grid modernization policies has engaged a
considerably wider-than-normal group of stakeholder participants,
through a substantial commitment of regulators’ time and effort.28
This Article is organized as follows: Parts I through III give a
brief overview of grid modernization and energy poverty as
separate topics. Part IV delves into the story of how New York
accommodated the marriage of these two issues in its ambitious
REV process, and Part V draws some lessons from its experience
to inform other emerging state forays into grid modernization.
I.
THE PROMISE OF GRID MODERNIZATION
It is “easy enough to make the case for smart grid
development.”29 There are many wondrous benefits that grid
modernization might bring—not least of which is the potential
alleviation of energy poverty. This section briefly reviews the
many reasons the project of grid modernization deserves all the
attention it has recently received, and more. This discussion is
short because many authors have chronicled these benefits at
considerably greater length.30
In its most capacious usage, “grid modernization” refers to two
sets of interlocking projects and objectives: modernizing
“antiquated” portions of the grid and expanding the grid where
ADDRESS ENERGY AFFORDABILITY FOR LOW INCOME UTILITY CUSTOMERS, NO.
14-M-0565, at 3–4 (N.Y.P.S.C., Aug. 24, 2015) [hereinafter NYPSC Comments
to Low Income Staff Report] (on file with author).
28
See infra Part IV.
29
Cf. Elias L. Quinn & Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network
Architecture, Information Control, and the Public Policy Balancing Act, 81 U.
COLO. L. REV. 833, 861 (2010) (noting consistent with my introductory remarks,
that it is “easy enough to make the case for smart grid development,” but
“harder to lay out a plan for its actual deployment in any specific region or
jurisdiction”).
30
See generally Massachusetts Institute of Technology, supra note 2; Quinn
& Reed, supra note 29; Eisen, supra note 2; PETER FOX-PENNER, SMART
POWER: CLIMATE CHANGE, THE SMART GRID, & THE FUTURE OF ELECTRIC
UTILITIES (2010); GRETCHEN BAKKE, THE GRID: THE FRAYING WIRES BETWEEN
AMERICANS AND OUR ENERGY FUTURE (2016).
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necessary;31 and “providing consumers with dramatic new ways to
make, use, and conserve electricity.”32 The first project, grid
retooling, focuses largely on upgrades to utility-owned equipment
and services—such as investments in new transmission
infrastructure, voltage support devices, and network monitoring
systems.33 The second project—opening up the electricity grid to
consumer-side
participation—requires
both
technological
investment and substantial recalibration of social relations around
electricity. Consumers must be given the tools and knowledge to
become “participants” in the electric grid.34
Smart meter deployment is critical to this transition.35 These
meters record electricity consumption in granular detail, so that
31

Massachusetts Institute of Technology, supra note 2, at 7 (noting the grid is
often referred to as “antiquated,” although taking some issue with the
characterization).
32
Eisen, supra note 2, at 3; Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007,
42 U.S.C. §§ 17381–17386 (2007) (“Statement of Policy on the Modernization
of Electricity Grid”). See Massachusetts Institute of Technology, supra note 2, at
11–12; Paul L. Joskow, Creating a Smarter U.S. Electricity Grid, 26 J. ECON.
PERSP. 29, 40 (2012). MINN. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON GRID
MODERNIZATION
1–2
(Mar.
2016),
http://morethansmart.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/MNPUC_Staff_Report_on_Grid_Modernization_Marc
h2016.pdf. (“A modernized grid assures continued safe, reliable, and resilient
utility network operations, and enables Minnesota to meet its energy policy
goals, including the integration of variable renewable electricity sources and
distributed energy resources. An integrated, modern grid provides for greater
system efficiency and greater utilization of grid assets, enables the development
of new products and services, provides customers with necessary information
and tools to enable their energy choices, and supports a standards-based and
interoperable utility network.”).
33
See Massachusetts Institute of Technology, supra note 2, at 31-52
(describing these technologies in detail).
34
See Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, U. COLO. L. REV., 14
(forthcoming 2017) [hereinafter Welton, Clean Electrification] (describing state
movement towards a “participatory grid”); see also, e.g., Douglas, supra note
21, at 3 (“Customer participation, more than the actions of the utilities or of the
regulators, is critical to meet California’s greenhouse gas emission goals in a
cost-effective manner.”).
35
Joel B. Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources, “Virtual Power Plants,” and
the Smart Grid, 7 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 191, 200 (2012) [hereinafter
Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources] (“Price signals cannot be made available
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one can measure changes in consumption throughout the day.36 As
of late 2016, utilities and other grid operators had installed 57.1
million of these meters in approximately 49% of U.S. households
(and an additional 7.3 million in businesses and industrial
operations).37 Smart meters allow utilities to better understand the
ebb and flow of consumer electricity demand, creating the
possibility of smarter programs to manage consumer demand
during periods of grid stress.38 More profoundly, smart meter
installation allows for the implementation of a reform long touted
by economists and scholars of utility regulation: a transition from
flat-fee, per-kilowatt-hour payments39 to more “dynamic” forms of
pricing. Under dynamic pricing, the price that end-use consumers
pay reflects the price that electricity actually costs to generate,
which fluctuates considerably throughout the day.40
to consumers without investments in advanced ‘smart meters’ and other systems
to support them.”).
36
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=108&t=3 (last visited Feb. 23, 2017)
[hereinafter USEIA] (“Advanced metering infrastructure includes meters that
measure and record electricity usage at a minimum of hourly intervals and that
provide the data to both the utility and the utility customer at least once a day.
AMI installations range from basic hourly interval meters to real-time meters
with built-in two-way communication that is capable of recording and
transmitting instantaneous data.”).
37
This statistic was obtained by dividing the Energy Information
Administration’s reported number of residential smart meter installations – 57.1
million – by the U.S. Census Bureau’s latest statistics regarding the number of
U.S. households – 117 million. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., An Assessment of
Interval Data and Their Potential Application to Residential Electricity End-Use
Modeling 3 (Feb. 2015); UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 5.
38
United States Energy Information Administration, supra note 37; Mike
Faden, “Smart-Grid” Appliances, 6 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & THE ENV’T 62,
62 (2008).
39
See Joshua A. Blonz, Making the Best of the Second-Best: Welfare
Consequences of Time-Varying Electricity Prices 1 (Energy Inst. at Haas,
Working Paper No. 275, 2016).
40
See generally Severin Borenstein, Effective and Equitable Adoption of OptIn Residential Dynamic Electricity Pricing, 42 REV. INDUS. ORG. 127, 127
(2013) [hereinafter Borenstein, Dynamic Electricity Pricing] (“Economists who
study electricity markets are virtually unanimous in arguing that time-varying
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“Dynamic” pricing can take several forms. Real-time pricing
links retail rates directly to the wholesale price of electricity.41
Other less drastic options include time-of-use rates, which employ
several different pricing levels for different times of day; and
critical peak pricing, which prices certain particularly expensive
hours much higher (generally 100–200 hours per year).42 It is
generally believed that altering retail prices might be one of the
most efficient, effective ways to motivate the kinds of consumer
participation that smart grid proponents hope to achieve.43 With
dynamic pricing in place, consumers would have concrete
economic incentives to invest in the range of technologies
previewed in the Introduction, including solar panels; “smart”
thermostats; dishwashers, washers, and dryers capable of starting

retail pricing for electricity would improve the efficiency of electricity systems
and would lower the overall cost of meeting electricity demand.”); Joskow,
supra note 32, at 32 (showing graph of fluctuations in New England’s real-time
energy prices on a single day). Dynamic pricing’s benefits have long been
understood—“[a study from] the late 1970s produced over 100 reports that
outlined why dynamic pricing was important and described how it could be
achieved.” Theresa Flaim et al., Pilot Paralysis: Why Dynamic Pricing Remains
Over-Hyped and Underachieved, 26(4) ELECTRICITY J. 8, 8 (2013). See also
JAMES C. BONBRIGHT, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); Stephen
Buryk et al., Investigating Preferences for Dynamic Electricity Tariffs: The
Effect of Environmental and System Benefit Disclosure, 80 ENERGY POL’Y 190,
190 (2015); FOX-PENNER, supra note 30, at 49.
41
See Blonz, supra note 39, at 1.
42
See id. at 1–2; Eisen, supra note 2, at 19. Critical peak pricing programs are
the most common form of dynamic pricing programs in the United States at
present. Blonz, supra note 39, at 2; see also Zheng Hu et al., Review of Dynamic
Pricing Programs in the U.S. and Europe: Status Quo and Policy
Recommendations, 42 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV’S 743 (2015).
43
See generally Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 12, at 381–82 (tracing the 50year history of the theory of dynamic pricing); Blonz, supra note 39, at I
(explaining how flat rates “lead[] to overconsumption during peak periods,
requiring the construction of excess generation capacity compared to first-best
prices that adjust at short time intervals to reflect changing marginal cost” and
finding that well-constructed time-of-use rates could produce significant welfare
gains); see also Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at 871.
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and stopping in response to changes in electricity pricing; electric
vehicles; and rooftop storage systems.44
Grid modernization holds potential efficienct, environmental,
and social gains. In its fullest instantiation, it might create
“spectacular technological breakthroughs, the rise of entire new
industries, and consumer uses far beyond anyone’s wildest
dreams.”45 Although likely to impose significant up-front expenses,
many experts predict that investments in grid modernizing
technologies will ultimately save society considerable money, as
an updated “grid would ‘operate more efficiently, would need less
maintenance and large-scale infrastructural investment, and would
fall victim to fewer ‘power disturbances” such as outages and
overloads that impose significant costs on the U.S. economy.’”46
Additionally, the modernization of equipment and integration of
consumer-side offerings is likely to prove critical in the U.S. effort
to transition to greater reliance on renewable energy.47 Because
renewables operate “intermittently,” when the sun shines or the
wind blows, integrating them in high quantities is much easier if
there is an ability to respond rapidly to shifts in supply with near44

Eisen, supra note 2, at 10–11; Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at 871 (“To
this end, these efforts would be best supported by technologies that provide
targeted, real-time information to electricity customers, and measured usage in
relatively small time slices so that electricity consumers are aware of specific
appliance loads and can react in an informed way to either price signals or
environmental directives and information.”).
45
Eisen, supra note 2, at 3. Some envision that a smart grid might ultimately
allow consumers to contract directly with producers of electricity, such that you
could pick to buy your produce and your wind from the same trusted farmer
down the road. See Matthew Crosby, An Airbnb or Uber for the Electricity
Grid?,
RMI
BLOG
(Sept.
2,
2014),
http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2014_09_02_an_airbnb_or_uber_for_the_electricity_gr
id.
46
Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at 837.
47
Twenty-nine U.S. states have “renewable portfolio standards” in place that
aim to promote enhanced reliance on renewable energy sources in the coming
decades. See DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY
(DSIRE), RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES (Feb. 2017),
http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Renewa
ble-Portfolio-Standards_Feb2017.pdf.
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contemporaneous shifts in demand.48 A modernized grid could
enable precisely this type of quick-fire management of electricity
demand.49 At the same time, by empowering greater potential
demand reductions, grid modernization would help “avoid
unnecessary expenses of building new generation, transmission,
and distribution infrastructure.”50 In addition, grid modernization
may hold much-vaunted job-creating potential, as it will provide
opportunities for new companies to emerge and situate themselves
as “energy managers” for consumers who have limited inclination
to invest their own time and resources in grid participation.51
II.
GETTING THERE: ROLES AND IMPEDIMENTS
To extol the virtues of a modern grid invites the question of
why we all are not already boasting the suite of high-tech gadgets
previewed above, or receiving monthly “negative bills” from our
energy management companies detailing the amount of energy
savings they have earned us in the last month (after subtracting out
their cut of these savings, naturally). Grid modernization, as a
theory, has been around a long while, and yet the future it portends
still feels at least marginally in the realm of science fiction, rather
than reality.

48

Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at 838; Eisen, Distributed Energy Resources,
supra note 35, at 195.
49
See Borenstein, Dynamic Electricity Pricing, supra note 40, at 130
(“Dynamic pricing makes it possible to match more closely demand fluctuations
to the exogenous supply fluctuations and, thus, reduce the system costs of
integrating these renewable energy sources.”); Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at
838; Buryk et al., supra note 40, at 191. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission has estimated that demand response programs, aimed at cutting
demand during peak periods, could eliminate about 8.7% of U.S. peak demand.
See Flaim et al., supra note 40, at 9.
50
Eisen, supra note 2, at 12. See generally Shelley Welton, Non-Transmission
Alternatives, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 457 (2015); Elec. Power Research Inst.
(EPRI), The Green Grid: Energy Savings and Carbon Emissions Reductions
Enabled
by
a
Smart
Grid.,
No.
1016905,
1–3
(2008),
https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/The_Green_
Grid_Energy_Savings_Carbon_Emission_Reduction_En_200812.pdf.
51
See Eisen, supra note 2, at 12.
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As with the task of envisioning and defining grid
modernization, many scholars have taken us a long way towards
understanding why grid modernization has been such a slow
process. This part summarizes their research regarding reasons for
delay, almost all of which fall within the realm of social or
regulatory—rather than technical—impediments. Because the
impediments are chiefly of this variety, it is necessary to explain in
a bit more detail the regulatory role in grid modernization before
chronicling its challenges.
A. The Regulatory Role in Grid Modernization
Decades after the “deregulation” of many major U.S.
industries,52 energy regulation continues to be relatively heavyhanded. There are good reasons for this heavy-handedness: unlike
most products, electricity requires perfect, second-by-second
balancing between quantities of electricity being supplied into the
grid, and quantities of electricity being drawn out of it.53 Without
constant monitoring, the electricity grid would cease to function,
and blackouts would become the norm.54
Moreover, the prevailing U.S. sentiment is that electricity is a
modern necessity that should be made available to every American
willing and able to pay for it.55 This sentiment is instantiated in the
regulatory structure of every U.S. state, in which a “Public Utility
Commission” (“PUC”) oversees monopoly electric utilities. In
exchange for being granted an exclusive service area, these utilities
agree to supply all residents of that area with electricity at PUCdetermined “just and reasonable” rates.56 Included in these rates are
the utilities’ costs of generating or purchasing electric power, as
52

See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of
Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
53
See Joskow, supra note 32, at 31–33.
54
Right now, the grid does not have significant storage capacity to smooth out
differences in supply and demand, although the development of greater storage
capacity may help alleviate this problem in the future. See Joskow, supra note
32, at 36.
55
See Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 34, at 107.
56
See id. at 111; see also 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 3 (1988).
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well as their costs of constructing the transmission and distribution
infrastructure necessary to move electricity to customers.57
PUCs thus have a significant role to play in determining how
grid modernization unfolds. For those expenses that utilities will
incur—including upgrades to the transmission and distribution
infrastructure—PUCs have to decide whether or not to allow
utilities to recoup the costs from their customers as part of “just
and reasonable” rates.58 Similarly, PUCs play a prominent role in
deciding whether or not to move customers towards any forms of
“dynamic pricing.”59 PUCs are also responsible for figuring out
how to compensate distributed energy technologies that consumers
might deploy to supply extra power to the grid, such as rooftop
solar panels.60 For all of these reasons, PUCs have become the
locus of substantial societal contestation over grid modernization.
In these contests, they have embraced modernization only halfheartedly and often reluctantly, for reasons that are the focus of the
remainder of this article.

57

In providing this short summary of state regulatory structures, this Article
necessarily glosses over some significant disparities among various states in the
country. For a thorough explanation of the flavors of state electricity regulation,
and how this basic structure has evolved in many states over time, see William
Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy
Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810 (2016).
58
See Eisen, supra note 2, at 17; see also, e.g., In re Baltimore Gas & Elec.,
101 Md. P.S.C. 149, at 6 (Md. P.S.C., June 21, 2010) (Authorization to Deploy a
Smart Grid Initiative and to Establish a Surcharge for the Recovery of Cost)
(rejecting utility’s application for a smart grid program in part because the
Commission was “persuaded that some of the Company’s most vulnerable
residential customers . . . are less likely to realize the potential benefits of [timeof-use] pricing than would the ‘average’ residential customer”).
59
For discussion of the various forms of dynamic pricing, see supra note 42.
60
See Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 34, at 20–25; see also Sanya
Carley & Lincoln L. Davies, Nevada’s Net Energy Metering Experience: The
Making of a Policy Eclipse?, BROOKINGS MOUNTAIN WEST (2016),
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=br
ookings_pubs.
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B. Well-Documented Challenges
This article is far from the first to observe that social
impediments—rather than technical—form the chief barrier to grid
modernization. This subpart briefly summarizes the research that
has been done to date on reasons why grid modernization is
proceeding more slowly than its proponents might desire, or
economic theory might predict.61 These challenges might be
grouped into two broad categories: (1) misaligned utility and
regulatory incentives, and (2) individual cognitive and behavioral
barriers.
Joel Eisen suggests that one key challenge facing grid
modernization is the inherent conservatism of utilities and state
PUCs. Given PUCs’ mandate to maintain “just and reasonable
rates,” these institutions shy away from allowing utilities to
recover from consumers any infrastructure investments that do not
provide clear and imminent economic gains to consumers.62
However, the benefits of grid modernization may not be apparent
or certain until a whole suite of presently non-existent technologies
and changes come into place—not just infrastructure investments
and advanced metering installation, but the emergence of new
companies, technologies, and pricing structures to respond to these
advancements.63 For this reason, PUCs have expressed skepticism
about the cost-benefit tradeoff of asking customers to fund the
early utility-side infrastructure necessary to enable a full-throated
version of grid modernization.64
Similar skepticism exists around significant changes to current
electricity pricing. “At the residential level, time-varying pricing
has gotten very little traction in any form.”65 Opt-in schemes are
unpopular with consumers, and few state regulators are willing to
61

See Joskow, supra note 32, at 40.
Eisen, supra note 2, at 17.
63
See supra Part I.
64
See Eisen, supra note 2, at 17; Joskow, supra note 32, at 15.
65
Borenstein, Dynamic Electricity Pricing, supra note 40, at 127–28
(“[T]ime-varying retail electricity pricing is very popular with economists, but
has little support among regulators and consumers.”).
62
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require mandatory or even default dynamic pricing regimes.66 This
hesitance is due in part to worries that consumers will not
understand or appropriately utilize new pricing structures.67
However, Catherine Wolfram and Paul Joskow argue that evidence
from recent pilot experiments suggests quite the opposite: a
substantial portion of customers in many pilots understand and
respond to differentials in electricity prices over time.68 For this
reason, they suggest that “[t]he fear of large redistributions across
customers is possibly the largest impediment to further adoption of
dynamic pricing.”69 That is to say, regulators are most worried
about those who will not respond to dynamic pricing, and thus see
their bills go up.70
A few scholars have tackled the question of precisely whose
bills might rise under dynamic pricing with mixed results. Some
find that low-income households are not systematically
disadvantaged by dynamic pricing, while others have found cause
for concern.71 The following sections contextualize the importance
66

California is poised to become the first state to create default time-of-use
rates, which should become active in 2019. See California Rulemaking, supra
note 21, at 1; Laurie Guevara-Stone, California Flattens Rate Blocks, Rolls Out
Default Time-Of-Use Pricing, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INST. BLOG (Jun. 5, 2015),
http://blog.rmi.org/blog_2015_06_05_california_flattens_rate_blocks_rolls_out_
default_time_of_use_pricing.
67
Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 12, at 383; see also, Borenstein, Dynamic
Electricity Pricing, supra note 40, at 137.
68
Joskow & Wolfram, supra note 12, at 383.
69
Id. at 384.
70
See id. at 384
71
See Borenstein, Dynamic Electricity Pricing, supra note 40, at 144–45
(collecting sources on both sides of this debate and finding in his own study that
low-income consumers would not benefit substantially, although most would see
only small bill changes); see also Flaim et al., supra note 40, at 18 (finding that
control technologies are important in being able to respond to dynamic pricing);
Faruqui, supra note 14, at 21–22 (suggesting that low-income consumers might
on the whole benefit from a shift to dynamic pricing); Frank A. Felder, The
Equity Implications of Smart Grid: Questioning the Size and Distribution of
Smart Grid Costs and Benefits, in SMART GRID: INTEGRATING RENEWABLE,
DISTRIBUTED AND EFFICIENT ENERGY 85, 88 (2012) (“There is nothing close to
a majority view, let alone a near consensus, that these technologies should be
adopted.”); William W. Hogan, Fairness and Dynamic Pricing: Comments,
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of this mixed evidence, observing that these inconclusive empirics
present substantial concerns to regulators.
Utilities, for their part, have obvious self-preservation instincts
that may conflict with the project of grid modernization. Some of
the investments required to modernize the grid might benefit
utilities’ bottom line, by allowing them to invest in new
infrastructure on which they earn a PUC-established “rate of
return.”72 But at the same time, “traditional rate-of-return
regulation creates incentives in many ways antithetical to the
modern project of electricity reform.”73 Efforts to cut consumers’
energy demand and allow them to self-generate a portion of their
electricity needs cuts against utilities’ core business—the selling of
electricity.74 For this reason, utilities may hesitate to promote many
components of grid modernization, and may actively argue against
their adoption by state regulators.75
On the other side of the meter, even though consumers stand to
benefit considerably in the long run from grid modernization,
many of our human instincts impede us from getting to that point.
The costs of getting set up with all the gadgetry necessary to

23(6) ELECTRICITY J. 28, 29 (2010) (arguing that “existing tariff designs with
constant prices already embed distributional consequences”). See also Welton,
Clean Electrification, supra note 34 (gathering evidence on both sides of this
debate).
72
Quinn & Reed, supra note 29, at 873.
73
Id.
74
Quinn and Reed observe that certain technologies—including advanced
metering and home automation for time-shifting of demand—might “reduce
costs while otherwise maintaining existing sales levels,” but argue that on the
whole, smart grid technologies are likely to harm utilities’ profitability. Id.
75
Id. at 873–74; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for
You, Bad for Us: The Financial Disincentive for Net Demand Reduction, 65
VAND. L. REV. 1527 1544–45 (2012). One prominent example of utility
resistance emerges in the battles over state net metering policies, which are
under assault in dozens of states across the country. Utilities dislike these
policies because they promote rooftop solar via generous buy-back policies for
solar panel owners, causing utilities to lose customer revenue. See Welton,
Clean Electrification, supra note 34.
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“participate” in the modern grid76 are substantial, both in terms of
time and money.77 And the gadgets themselves aren’t exactly
trendy must-haves—as Eisen has observed, “[n]o one is standing in
line at an Apple Store for a smart thermostat78 Nor is it clear
whether and how consumers might access all the data that smart
meters’ provide about their individualized use, as state laws
regarding this data remain unsatisfactory or inconclusive on this
point.79 All of which leaves consumers—similarly to regulators—
hesitant to move first in adopting grid modernization technologies,
or to opt into any variety of dynamic pricing that might increase
the volatility of their bills.80
Consumers have expressed a separate, substantial worry with
grid modernization that can only be partially attributed to cognitive
failings: that of consumer privacy. In brief, the concern is that
advanced meters, with their near-constant monitoring of household
electricity usage, may give regulators and utilities a new world of
information about how we each live our wired-in lives “within the

76

See Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 34 (chronicling state efforts
to create a “participatory” grid).
77
Eisen, supra note 2, at 15; Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson,
Remaking Energy: The Critical Role of Energy Consumption Data, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 1095, 1108–09 (2016).
78
Eisen, supra note 2, at 15.
79
See Klass & Wilson, supra note 77, at 1100, 1105 (arguing that “the
inability of municipalities, energy efficiency providers, and customers to easily
obtain energy consumption data in a standardized format excludes them from
participating in energy markets, evaluating different rate pricing schemes, and
understanding the value of energy investments” and suggesting that state PUCs
have by and large been slow to mandate standards for consumer interface with
this data).
80
Buryk et al., supra note 40, at 191 (finding that in “opt-in” dynamic pricing
pilots, only between 5% and 28% of persons asked were successfully recruited
to participate); Flaim et al., supra note 40, at 8 (“Despite the recent resurgence
of pilots and field trials, dynamic pricing at the retail level remains limited.”);
Eisen, supra note 2, at 19–20; Blonz, supra note 39, at 5 (“Some customers
would face significantly higher energy bills under real-time pricing, creating a
constituency opposed to the new pricing system.”).
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putative privacy of the home.”81 What might be revealed? Such
details as:
When you turn off the lights. When you take a shower. When
you leave home. Where your electric vehicle is being charged . . .
[I]f the security system is activated, if one cooks with a microwave
or the stove, the presence of certain medical equipment, how much
and when the household watches television . . . .82
Largely in response to these concerns, some PUCs are allowing
consumers “to refuse to be fitted with a smart meter if they do not
want one—for whatever reason.”83
All of these concerns are important elements of understanding
why the grid modernization project is going slower than expected
in many places. Nevertheless, this list ignores one important
additional impediment: that of regulators’ substantial concerns
over protecting those consumers experiencing “energy poverty.”
III.
UNDERSTANDING ENERGY POVERTY
When most people hear the term energy poverty, they think of
faraway places: women forced to walk hours to gather firewood
bundles that they lug home to cook with, villages with spotty or no
access to electricity, or cook stoves filling small huts with
dangerous emissions.84 These are, to be sure, substantial and
81

See Kevin L. Doran, Privacy and Smart Grid: When Progress and Privacy
Collide, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 909, 910 (2010); see also Eisen, supra note 2, at 16.
See generally Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 199 (2011); Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart
Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161 (2011); Samuel J. Harvey, Smart Meters,
Smarter Regulation: Balancing Privacy and Innovation in the Electric Grid, 61
UCLA L. REV. 2068 (2014).
82
Balough, supra note 81, at 161, 167.
83
ELECTRICITY, Dynamic Pricing, supra note 63, at 6 (emphasis in original)
(explaining that California has taken this step). Some consumers also worry
about electromagnetic fields (“EMF”) created by smart meters, and their
potential to induce headaches, nausea, and other physical symptoms. See id.
84
See, e.g., Fatih Birol, Energy Economics: A Place for Energy Poverty in the
Agenda?, 28 ENERGY J. 1, 2–4 (2007); UNITED NATIONS, SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
FOR
ALL: AN OVERVIEW 1, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/
SEFA.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2017); Christian E. Casillas & Daniel M.
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pressing problems. “Today, 1.6 billion people in developing
countries do not have access to electricity in their homes.”85 And
“2.5 billion people—40% of the world’s population—rely on
traditional biomass such as wood, agricultural residues and dung to
meet virtually all of their cooking energy needs.”86
But energy poverty is not a problem confined to developing
countries. Although different in degree if not kind, the energy
poverty challenges facing U.S. families remain substantial
impediments to fulfilling basic human and social needs,87 and stand
as a reproach to the long-standing aim of enabling all Americans to
access affordable electricity.88
Scholars are just beginning to grapple with the concept of
energy poverty in the United States,89 and definitional problems

Kammen, The Energy-Poverty-Climate Nexus, 330 SCI. 1181 (Nov. 2010);
Benjamin K. Sovacool, The Political Economy of Energy Poverty: A Review of
Key Challenges, 16 ENERGY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. 272, 273 (2012)
[hereinafter Sovacool, Energy Poverty] (“[T]he UNDP explicitly defines energy
poverty as the ‘inability to cook with modern cooking fuels and the lack of a
bare minimum of electric lighting to read or for other household and productive
activities at sunset.’” (quoting AMIE GAYE, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
2007/2008, ACCESS TO ENERGY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 4 (2007))).
85
Birol, supra note 84, at 3.
86
Id.
87
See Benjamin K. Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, Affordability, and Energy Justice
in England: Policy Insights from the Warm Front Program, 93 ENERGY 361,
361 (2012) [hereinafter Sovacool, Fuel Poverty] (“Though many may take it for
granted, having a warm, comfortable, well-lit home is an instrumental part of
modern, industrialized life.”); Diana Hernández, Sacrifice Along the Energy
Continuum: A Call for Energy Justice, 8 ENVTL. JUST. 151, 154 (“Whereas
infrastructure presents the most significant barrier to energy in the poorer
nations, the circumstances surrounding energy justice in industrialized nations
are more nuanced.”).
88
See Welton, supra note 34 (chronicling how this aim has manifested itself
throughout the history of U.S. electricity policy).
89
Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra note 87, at 361 (arguing that “the topic of
fuel poverty and vulnerability . . . is all too often ignored in contemporary
energy policy discussions”). The European Union, and the United Kingdom in
particular, are considerably further along in their discussion of energy poverty
and in developing policy responses to address it. See Ralitsa Petrova Hiteva,
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plague the field.90 In basic terms, energy poverty—also often
referred to as fuel poverty or energy insecurity91—is “the inability
of households to afford energy services for adequate heating and
cooling resulting in uncomfortable indoor temperatures, material
deprivation, and accumulated utility debt.”92 But of course,
electricity affords more than just livable temperatures in our
modern world—it is also essential for forming and maintaining
social connections, knowledge, and cultural capital.93
Fuel Poverty and Vulnerability in the EU Low-Carbon Transition: The Case of
Renewable Electricity, 18 LOC. ENV’T 487 (2013).
90
Sovacool, Energy Poverty, supra note 84, at 273 (“As there is no simple
definition of poverty, conceptualizing ‘energy poverty’ is a somewhat arduous
process.”).
91
Many researchers use the terms “energy poverty” and “fuel poverty” as
synonyms. See, e.g., Reames, supra note 4, at 549; Sovacool, Fuel Poverty,
supra note 87, at 362 (describing his work as “center[ing] the discussion of fuel
poverty not only on traditional notions of affordability or household energy
poverty, but also on novel notions of energy justice, ethics, and recognition”);
Conor Harrison & Jeff Popke, “Because You Got to Have Heat”: The
Networked Assemblage of Energy Poverty in Eastern North Carolina, 101
ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 949, 950 (2011). Others treat them as
overlapping but not necessarily synonymous concepts. See Kang Li et al.,
Energy Poor or Fuel Poor: What Are the Differences?, 68 ENERGY POL’Y 476–
81 (2014); Hiteva, supra note 89, at 492 (“[V]ariations exist in the way fuel
poverty is defined and the contexts within which it is sometimes interchangeably
used with the term energy poverty or distinguished from it.”). This Article treats
the concepts synonymously, and uses “energy poverty” throughout. However,
readers should take note that the terms do not have clearly delineated meanings,
and alternative phrasings exist. See Rosie Day & Gordon Walker, Household
Energy Vulnerability as ‘Assemblage,’ in ENERGY JUSTICE IN A CHANGING
CLIMATE, supra note 9, at 14 (“Partly because research and policy attention has
emerged in a quite differentiated manner, different languages have been
employed to characterize the problem that is at issue, including those of fuel
poverty, energy poverty, energy insecurity, energy deprivation and energy
precariousness.”).
92
Reames, supra note 4, at 549; Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra note 87, at 362
(reporting that inadequately heated housing results in “higher rates of mortality
among the elderly, a greater prevalence of circulatory and respiratory diseases in
adults, reduced physical and emotional well-being, and an increased risk of falls,
mental health illness, social isolation, and hospital admissions”).
93
To understand this assertion, imagine what life would look like without
your cell phone, computer, access to the internet or at least cable news, or the
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How can one know whether someone is suffering from energy
poverty? There is partial but incomplete overlap between
Americans in general poverty and the group experiencing energy
poverty specifically.94 “Poverty” is typically defined by reference
to a particular income level.95 Energy poverty, in contrast, is
defined specifically in terms of a household’s ability to maintain a
comfortable standard of existence in their home.96 Those
researchers most carefully theorizing energy poverty tend to resist
the tendency to describe it in quantifiable terms, preferring instead
to view it as “contingent,” “multidimensional in character and
produced through the coming together of social, technological, and
natural processes.”97 Often, though, as a practical matter, the
delineation of this contingent condition turns on the amount of
money a family must put specifically towards energy services each
month or year.98 When quantified, “energy poverty” is typically
defined by a measure of a household’s “energy burden,” which is
the percentage of income spent on energy.99 Measuring energy
burdens proves a useful way to disaggregate general poverty and
energy poverty, because:
Some people are poor but can afford adequate warmth.
Others with incomes above the accepted poverty line
nevertheless cannot afford to be warm—because their
home is difficult or expensive to heat. There are also people

ability to pick up a book, magazine, or newspaper before sunrise or after sunset.
Electricity, simply put, is the oft-hidden thread that binds together the fabric of
modern American society.
94
See Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra note 87, at 362.
95
See How the Census Bureau Measures Poverty, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/topics/income-poverty/poverty/guidance/poverty-measu
res.html (last updated Apr. 19, 2016).
96
Harrison & Popke, supra note 91, at 950.
97
Day & Walker, supra note 91, at 16. See also Will Anderson et al., Coping
with Low Incomes and Cold Homes, 49 ENERGY POL’Y 40, 40 (2012).
98
Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra note 87, at 362; Reames, supra note 4, at
550.
99
Reames, supra note 4, at 550.
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who purchase warmth only at the expense of adequate diets
or going short in other ways.100
In the United States, experts often pinpoint the “energy
burden” threshold for tipping into energy poverty as spending
more than 6% of the household income on energy.101 Some of the
poorest U.S. households spend 25 to 30% of their income on
energy.102 In contrast, the median U.S. household spends around
3.5% of its income on energy bills.103
There is no national U.S. survey designed to specifically
measure energy poverty;104 accordingly, estimates are hard to come
by. The federally administered Low Income Home Energy
Assistance Program (“LIHEAP”), which provides energy
assistance to a portion of those households in need, determines
eligibility by income alone, rather than energy burden.105
According to the most recent LIHEAP data available, 38.5 million
100

Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra note 87, at 362 (quoting Jonathan Bradshaw
& Sandra Hutton, Social Policy Options and Fuel Poverty, 3 J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
249 (1983)).
101
See Dan Boyce & Jordan Wirfs-Brock, High Utility Costs Force Hard
Decisions
for
the
Poor,
INSIDE
ENERGY
(May
8,
2016),
http://insideenergy.org/2016/05/08/high-utility-costs-force-hard-decisions-forthe-poor/; Adam Chandler, Where the Poor Spend More Than 10 Percent of
Their
Income
on
Energy,
THE
ATLANTIC (June
8,
2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/
business/archive/2016/06/energy-poverty-low-income-households/486197/. In
Europe, where energy is more expensive, the figure is often 10%. Sovacool,
Fuel Poverty, supra note 87.
102
Boyce & Wirfs-Brock, supra note 101.
103
ARIEL DREHOBL & LAUREN ROSS, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGYEFFICIENT ECON., LIFTING THE HIGH ENERGY BURDEN IN AMERICA’S LARGEST
CITIES: HOW ENERGY EFFICIENCY CAN IMPROVE LOW INCOME AND
UNDERSERVED
COMMUNITIES
4
(Apr.
2016),
http://aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u1602.pdf
[hereinafter ACEEE REPORT].
104
Hernández, supra note 87, at 153.
105
Off. of Cmty. Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., Low Income
Home Energy Assistance Program: Report to Congress for Fiscal Year 2014, vvi,
83,
45
n.2
(2014),
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocs/fy14_liheap_rtc_final.pdf
[hereinafter LIHEAP].
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U.S. households had incomes that qualified for home energy
assistance under the federal income standard.106 Private data
suggests that the “energy affordability gap” in the United States—
by which the authors mean the amount of money that Americans
spend on energy above “affordable” energy bills107—was around
$41 billion in 2015 (up from $18.2 billion in 2003).108 Additional
research suggests that the disparity in energy burdens results in
large part from the fact that low-income homes are less efficient,
such that the poor spend more not only as a percentage of income
but also on a per-square-foot basis.109
Although some energy bill assistance is available to households
in need, it comes nowhere close to meeting the “affordability gap”
described above. In 2015, LIHEAP funds provided $3.3 billion in
funding, reaching only 6.3 million of the 38.5 million federally
eligible households, and covering only a portion of each of these
household’s needs.110 A “scattering” of additional state programs—
typically funded by ratepayers and administered by utilities—helps

106

The federally qualifying income is 150% or less of federal poverty
guidelines, although states are permitted to set more stringent standards. Id. at v.
107
“Affordability” is calculated using the 6% energy burden figure, but the
authors do not report the total number of U.S. households whose utility spending
rises above this percentage. Fisher Sheehan et al., What is the Home Energy
Affordability
Gap?,
HOME
ENERGY
AFFORDABILITY
GAP,
http://www.homeenergyaffordabilitygap.com/01_whatIsHEAG2.html#
(last
visited Feb. 23, 2017).
108
Id.
109
See ACEEE Report, supra note 103, at 4; see also ARIEL DREHOBL &
LAUREN ROSS, AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., THE US LOWINCOME ENERGY AFFORDABILITY LANDSCAPE: ALLEVIATING HIGH ENERGY
BURDEN WITH ENERGY EFFICIENCY IN LOW-INCOME COMMUNITIES 2 (2016),
http://aceee.org/files/proceedings/2016/data/papers/11_326.pdf (finding that
low-income households pay $1.41 per square foot, compared to a household
average of $1.23 per square foot) [hereinafter ACEEE STUDY].
110
LIHEAP, supra note 105, at vi (reporting that the average level of
assistance was $366); see also FISHER SHEEHAN ET. AL., THE HOME ENERGY
AFFORDABILITY
GAP
2015
(2016),
http://www.homeenergyaffordabilitygap.com/downloads/2015_Released_Apr16
/HEAG2015%20Regional%20Fact%20Sheets.pdf.
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fill remaining needs in some states, but none come close to closing
the gap.111
Unsurprisingly, the concepts of “energy burdens” or an
“affordability gap” fail to fully capture the lived experience of
energy poverty.112 Consider the following accounts, all drawn from
public testimony to the New York State Public Service
Commission in 2016:
John Washington, in Buffalo, NY: This system is designed
to keep people poor, to keep them cold, to keep them
unhealthy, and to keep them hungry. It is designed to
transfer our public wealth to private institutions. You may
disagree, but National Fuel and National Grid [two New
York utility companies] are private institutions that pay
their C.E.O.s millions of dollars. There is absolutely no
reason, except for profit, that 800 million dollars of arrears
exists [in New York State]. That should be immediately
wiped out. . . . Last week, I had my lights cut off. My
family slept in the dark for 2 days because I paid 6 dollars
and 95 cents less than the program that I was in wanted.
You don’t think I wanted to pay 6 dollars and 95 cents?
You don’t think I wanted to do that? Have you ever slept in
a dark apartment? Have you ever had your child ask you
why can’t the lights go on? I have a 3-year-old. He doesn’t
111

Meg Power, Fuel Poverty in the USA: The Overview and the Outlook, 98
ENERGY ACTION 1 (Mar. 2006) (“Simple price discounts for vulnerable
households identified by a service agency remain the preferred tool for
sympathetic regulators; in some states this is supplemented by modest
investment in programmes of energy advice and/or guidance on other sources of
assistance and managing household budgets.”); see also ACEEE REPORT, supra
note 103, at 27–28; ACEEE STUDY, supra note 109, at 1.
112
Conor Harrison, The Historical–Geographical Construction of Power:
Electricity in Eastern North Carolina, 18 LOC. ENV’T. 469, 471 (2013) (“[I]t is
not only expensive electricity that leads to energy poverty, rather it results from
a range of factors and relationships, including the sources and types of
household energy, the energy efficiency of a given home, and the unique
circumstances individuals and groups face in order to stay comfortable in their
home.”). See infra Part IV for a more robust description of one state’s
programs—New York.
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understand this. . . . All he wants to do is watch cartoons
with his dad. But his dad couldn’t pay 6.95, so he’s got to
cry himself to sleep. I want you to think about that.113
Dawn Rounds, in Buffalo, NY: But with the bills, the
only thing we have to support ourselves with is his military
pension, and my bills keep getting higher and higher, and I
don’t know should I buy food, his medicine, her medicine,
pay the bills? I go to HEAP [LIHEAP], but HEAP for
electric doesn’t even start until January. I need the electric
to turn my heater on. Many times I’ve had the electric shut
off until I could get help and we’d have no heat or electric.
We struggle every day. I’m always behind. Borrow from
Peter to pay Paul. We’ve been living where we are now for
about eight years, and it’s just getting harder and harder.
We got a little bit of extra income for my granddaughter,
but because of the extra income, our food stamps went
down and my rent went up.114
Zakiyyah Salahuddin, in Poughkeepsie, NY: Have you
ever been cold and frozen inside your house? It’s colder
than the freezer. You see your breath. Your lungs get
messed up. You start deteriorating. I sleep in my car for the
past four years, yeah, ‘cause it’s warmer. I can put on the
heat then. And in the day I get in, wash and do whatever I
have to do.115

113

Proceeding on the Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to
Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers: Public
Statement Hearing Before the N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, at 42–
43 (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:00 p.m.) (statement of John Washington, Buffalo transcript).
114
Proceeding on the Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to
Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers: Public
Statement Hearing Before the N.Y Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, at 22
(Oct. 1, 2015, 7:00 p.m.) (statement of Dawn Rounds, Buffalo transcript).
115
Proceeding on the Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to
Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers: Public
Statement Hearing Before the N.Y Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, at 35
(Sept. 24, 2015, 7:00 p.m.) (statement of Zakiyyah Salahuddin, Poughkeepsie
transcript).
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Deborah May, in Poughkeepsie, NY: I got a call a few
months ago from an undesirable place, I won’t name it, and
I went over there, and they were happy to have me, and I
said well, let me talk to some of the people who live here
first, and I talked to about ten people there, and they all told
me the same story: You think it’s cheap to live here, but be
ready to wear your winter coat inside all year, because if
you have the heat on, you will be paying as much as for
electric as you are for rent. And everybody told me the
same thing. Now, I know it’s hearsay, but I’m telling you
that’s what they told me. And I realized I can’t even afford
public housing? I mean, that’s the cheapest thing you can
get and I can’t even afford that because of the added cost
of electricity. So I’m feeling really stuck.116
Suwany Westney, in New York City, NY: I’m on a
fixed income also, I get SSI and SSD. And in 2014, I got a
bill for three thousand dollars, and they—when I asked
them, they said they read the meter wrong, and they took
off like two thousand off the bill. But ever since then, I’ve
been backed up, and I’m on the budget payment. . . . And I
called them and said I cannot afford to pay the seven
hundred dollar bill, I was willing to pay four hundred
dollars and try to work on something like that. They said
no, and from that they turned off my lights.117
Much better than statistical accounts, these testimonials help
illustrate the frustrations and humiliations that arise from the ways
in which electricity law, and in particular utility rate regulation,
interacts with poverty in the United States. More remains to be
done to connect such lived experiences to policy discussions, but
important work exists in this direction. Recent research has added
116

Id. at 42–43 (statement of Deborah May, Poughkeepsie transcript) (on file
with author).
117
Proceeding on the Motion of the Commission to Examine Programs to
Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility Customers: Public
Statement Hearing Before the N.Y Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, at 49
(Oct. 13, 2015, 7:00 p.m.) (statement of Suwany Westney, New York transcript)
(on file with author).
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sociological and historical depth to the concept of energy poverty
by describing the ways in which these statistics interact with
housing infrastructure and urban settlement patterns,118 as well as
the ways in which the economics of electricity influenced its
geographical spread and contributed to current patterns of energy
poverty.119 For example, Diana Hernández charts disparate pockets
of energy poverty in Detroit, where “almost 27 percent of lowincome households fell behind on utility payments and an
additional seven percent experienced a utility shut-off [following
the Great Recession].”120 Hernández links these disparate rates with
race and class, finding that:
Blacks were almost twice as likely as non-blacks to report
being behind on utilities payments (41% versus 22%) and over
three times more likely to experience a utility service shut-off than
non-blacks (15% versus 4%). Low (38%) and moderate-income
(32%) groups were disproportionately more likely to be behind on
utilities payments as well as to experience a shut-off (14% and 5%,
respectively) compared to higher income households in each
category (14% and 2%, respectively).121
These more nuanced emerging accounts of energy poverty help
answer certain questions often asked of those researching the topic:
Why should we focus on this aspect of poverty, to the exclusion of
others? What’s the use in addressing energy poverty separately
from the general problems of poverty or inequality plaguing the
United States? This Article’s intention is not to promote energy
poverty to a place of primacy above the other challenges of
poverty in the United States. But it remains a useful disaggregated
measure for purposes of energy law because energy regulators play
a particular role both in creating the problem and in responding to
it.
118

See Reames, supra note 4; Diana Hernández & Stephen Bird, Energy
Burden and the Need for Integrated Low-Income Housing and Energy Policy, 2
POVERTY & PUB. POL’Y 5, 5, 10 (Nov. 2010).
119
See Harrison, supra note 112 (exploring the “historical–geographical
foundations of energy poverty” in Eastern North Carolina).
120
Hernández, supra note 87, at 151.
121
Id.
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To understand why, Connor Harrison’s historical examination
of energy poverty in North Carolina proves illuminating. Harrison
paints a scene of significant disparities in the price of electricity
across various Eastern North Carolina cities and towns and
explains these disparities largely in terms of the history of
electrification.122 Electricity came to rural North Carolina “as part
of a state-led modernisation effort aimed at a particular type of
progress during the early and middle parts of the twentieth
century.”123 This state-led effort resulted in the formation of rural
electric cooperatives, whose economics only made sense if
consumption patterns were sufficiently high to justify the building
of transmission lines.124 Consequently, the leaders of rural
electrification efforts viewed their objective as not only providing
access to electricity but also as “build[ing] up the psychology of
generous use of electricity.”125 Thus, energy regulators put in place
policies aimed at encouraging households to use increasing
quantities of electricity—the same quantities that now threaten the
stability of successive generations of these households.126
None of this history suggests energy poverty is any more
pressing of an issue than the housing crisis, or hunger and food
insecurity. What it does suggest is that the problem of energy
poverty is at least in part structurally created by the legal
frameworks governing electricity consumption.127 And it is
influenced not only by human agents, but also by the physical
122

Harrison, supra note 112, at 479.
Id.
124
See id.; see also Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 34 (on the
history of electrification and its economic as well as social drivers).
125
Harrison, supra note 112, at 479 (quoting Morris Cooke, an early leader of
the Rural Electrification Administration).
126
See id. at 480. Harrison goes on to describe the ways in which investment
in nuclear power caused rates to rise particularly rapidly for households tied to
publicly owned utilities, exacerbating the problem of their high levels of
consumption. See id. at 482–84.
127
Cf. id. at 484 (“If the high electricity bills and high electricity consumption
of the energy poor are to be put in their historic and geographic contexts, so
must the actions of the state and the electric utilities that helped produce
them.”).
123
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infrastructure that has been built to accommodate widespread
interconnection and consumption.128 Because this is the case, the
radical re-examination of electricity law’s governing frameworks
presents an opportunity to reconsider how regulators making
infrastructure decisions can either exacerbate or mitigate the
problem of energy poverty. Here is where grid modernization and
energy poverty intersect.
IV.

ENERGY POVERTY & GRID MODERNIZATION IN
CONVERSATION
The personal accounts of energy poverty quoted above
emerged out of New York’s REV proceedings. This final part tells
the story of how the REV proceedings precipitated such a
narrative-rich account of the problem of energy poverty and what
regulators did in response.
New York’s Public Service Commission (“the Commission”)
launched the REV proceeding in April 2014 with a fairly
standard—albeit ambitious—vision of grid modernization in mind:
“to align electric utility practices and our regulatory paradigm with
technological advances in information management and power
generation and distribution.”129 REV aims to promote
“improvements in system efficiency, greater customer choice, and
greater penetration of clean generation and energy efficiency
technologies,” by better aligning utility and customer incentives
with regulatory goals.130 The crux of the strategy involves
transforming utilities into engines for change by tying their earning
incentives to their ability to draw consumer-side resources into a
competitive marketplace.131 It is a deeply transformative—some

128

See Day & Walker, supra note 91, at 20.
NYPSC Order Instituting Proceeding, supra note 20, at 2.
130
Id.
131
See Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n in Regard to Reforming the
Energy Vision: Order Adopting Ratemaking and Utility Revenue Model Policy
Framework, 329 P.U.R.4th 1, 3 (May 19, 2016) (Order adopting a ratemaking
and utility revenue model policy framework).
129
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have even said “wildly ambitious”132—plan for reform, and three
years later, the Commission is still ironing out the details of how
REV will proceed.133
The Commission early on recognized that affordability would
be a key concern in the REV proceedings.134 The Order Instituting
Proceedings included this goal: “Maintain Commitment to
Affordable Universal Service.”135 It readily became apparent to the
Commission, however, that this aim would require more
concentrated attention than REV’s implementing documents
necessarily contemplated. Commenters quickly pushed the
Commission in this direction, through both procedural and
substantive arguments. Procedurally, several commenters urged the
Commission to slow down implementation, to allow for greater
citizen input and participation.136 Substantively, commenters called
the Commission’s attention to the plight of low-income New
Yorkers struggling to pay their electricity bills and insisted that
REV include this perspective as it moved forward.137

132

David Roberts, New York Is Transforming Its Energy Systems. Meet the
“Czar” in Charge., VOX (Nov. 20, 2015, 1:00 pm), http://www.vox.com/2015/
11/20/9769856/new-york-kauffman-interview.
133
See
DPS—Reforming
the
Energy
Vision,
N.Y.
STATE,
http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585257DEA0
07DCFE2?OpenDocument (last updated Jan. 20, 2017).
134
NYPSC Order Instituting Proceeding, supra note 20, at 58–59.
135
Id.
136
Letter from Beth Finkel, AARP & Russ Haven, NYPIRG, Pub. Util. Law
Project of N.Y., to the Honorable Kathleen Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv.
Comm’n 5 (July 18, 2014); see Letter from David Hepinstall, Exec. Director, &
Valerie Strauss, Director of Pol’y & Reg. Affs., Ass’n for Energy Affordability,
Inc. (AEA), to the Honorable Kathleen Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n
(July 18, 2014).
137
Letter from Beth Finkel & Russ Haven, Pub. Util. Law Project of N.Y., to
the Honorable Kathleen Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n 5 (July 17,
2014). See also Letter from Nat. Res. Def. Council et al., to the Honorable
Kathleen Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n (July 18, 2014); Letter from
David Hepinstall, Exec. Director, & Valerie Strauss, Director of Pol’y & Reg.
Affs., Ass’n for Energy Affordability, Inc. (AEA), to the Honorable Kathleen
Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n (July 18, 2014).
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The Commission responded to these concerns by launching a
separate “Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Examine
Programs to Address Energy Affordability for Low Income Utility
Customers” in January 2015.138 The Order began by recognizing
the long-standing but piecemeal nature of low-income protections
in New York electricity law.139 It declared the “primary purpose” of
the proceeding was to “standardize utility low income programs to
reflect best practices[,]” and directed Commission staff to provide
a report with recommendations to this effect.140 Note here how the
Commission’s language suggested a separation between issues of
affordability and the primary goals of REV—a point the Article
returns to below.
Commission Staff provided the requested report on June 1,
2015.141 The statistics presented in the report are sobering: the
Commission found that over one million New York households
(out of a total of around 8.2 million142) were in arrears on their
utility bills and owed a total of around $800 million to utilities.143
In the previous year, almost 300,000 New Yorker households had
utility service disconnected for non-payment.144 In terms of “energy
burdens,” Staff calculated that New Yorkers around the federal
poverty level spent between 15 and 22% of their income on
energy, and those at less than 50% of the federal poverty level
spent 41% (whereas “middle and higher income customers
138

Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n to Examine Programs to Address
Energy Affordability for Low Income Util. Customers, N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565 (Jan. 9, 2015) [hereinafter NY Order Instituting Low
Income Proceeding].
139
Id. at 2.
140
Id. at 4–5.
141
See STAFF REPORT, PROCEEDING OF THE COMM’N TO EXAMINE PROGRAMS
TO ADDRESS ENERGY AFFORDABILITY FOR LOW INCOME UTILITY CUSTOMERS,
N.Y. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, No. 14-M-0565 (June 1, 2015) [hereinafter NYPSC
Low-Income Staff Report].
142
QuickFacts, US CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
table/HSG010215/36 (last visited Feb. 22, 2017) (New York).
143
NYPSC Low-Income Staff Report, supra note 141, at 4. Total New York
state population is 19.25 million.
144
Id.
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experience energy costs in the general area of one to five
percent”).145 In terms of bill assistance, Staff found that “New
York’s current low income affordability programs provide[d] an
average annual benefit of roughly 10% of a residential customers’
total utility bill”—amounting to around $227 for those who
received gas and electric assistance.146
Staff noted wide disagreement on how to redesign low income
programs,147 but ultimately recommended a tiered system of
benefits, tying the level of assistance received to specific income
levels, so as to better target energy poverty by providing larger
discounts for those most in need.148 Staff further suggested that
programs should be aimed at reducing energy burdens to 6%,149
“with an overall increase in statewide program budgets of about
46%.”150
A group of thirty-four “bitterly disappointed” organizations
and elected officials offered two major criticisms of this
proposal.151 First, they suggested it did not do nearly enough to
widen the net of those eligible for energy poverty assistance, as
Staff pegged eligibility for the state programs to receipt of federal
energy assistance.152 According to the groups calculations, the
proposal would thereby “lock out the 50-70% of low-income New
Yorkers who are eligible for HEAP, but do not actually receive
it.”153 At the same time, the group was one of many calling for the
Commission to give considerably more thought to how to integrate
low-income affordability and the broader goals of the REV
proceeding, by providing more funding for low-income efficiency
145

Id. at 5.
Id. at 29.
147
Id. at 30.
148
NYPSC Low-Income Staff Report, supra note 141, at 31–41.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 34.
151
Group Comment submitted by Alliance for a Green Economy on
Proceeding of the Comm’n to Examine Programs to Address Energy
Affordability for Low Income Util. Customers, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No.
14-M-0565, at 2 (Aug. 24, 2015) [hereinafter Group Response].
152
Id.
153
Id. at 3.
146
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programs and considering creative new solutions: for example, by
“allow[ing] low-income discount recipients to redirect their
discounts into shared renewable energy projects, giving lowincome people a choice in where their electricity comes from and
reducing their utility costs.”154
At the same time, other groups pushed the Commission to do
more to hear and understand the concerns of those directly
experiencing energy poverty. In particular, groups requested more
hearings on the low-income affordability proceedings, held at
locations throughout the state.155 The Commission responded by
scheduling additional hearings throughout the state, resulting in a
total of twelve public hearing statements at which—as the
Commission noted in its final order:
[M]ore than 100 speakers offered statements on the Staff
Report, generating nearly 600 pages of transcript. Many of
the speakers were low income electric and natural gas
customers, who testified to the difficulties that they have

154

Id. at 4. See also Public Statement Hearing, Proceeding On The Motion Of
The Comm’n To Examine Programs To Address Energy Affordability For Low
Income Util. Customers, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, at 5 (Oct.
21, 2015, 7:00 p.m.) (statement of Richard Berkley, Albany transcript) (“Only
37 percent of [households meeting the current criteria for utility assistance] in
Albany County would be eligible for low-income energy assistance under the
Staff’s initial proposal”). See also NYPSC Comments to Low Income Staff
Report, supra note 27, at 3–4; Public Statement Hearing, Proceeding On The
Motion Of The Comm’n To Examine Programs To Address Energy
Affordability For Low Income Util. Customers, N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No.
14-M-0565, at 61 (Oct. 1, 2015, 3:00 p.m.) (statement of Maloney De Zuldivar,
Buffalo 2 transcript) (“And it has been mentioned multiple times, but the issue
of root causes, you say you’re only going to talk about discounts. Well, I know a
lot of people in the low- income communities that would be more than happy to
use the money that they get on discounts and put that to a shared renewable
facility. Invest in solar. Invest in the much needed home repairs and
weatherization.”).
155
Letter from Richard Berkley, Exec. Director, Pub. Util. Law Project of
N.Y., to The Honorable Kathleen Burgess, N.Y. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, at 1
(Sept. 25, 2015) (on file with author).
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faced paying for service, and the need to improve energy
affordability for the poorest New Yorkers.156
It is these personal accounts that appear in the section above on
energy poverty.
These hearings appear to have had a substantial impact on the
Commission’s course of action. The Commission’s May 2016
Final Order took two significant steps. First, it expanded state lowincome bill assistance programs considerably, aiming for a
program that caps the energy burden of all households in New
York at 6 percent.157 To do so, it increased ratepayer funding of
such programs by 87 percent.158 Second, despite having started the
proceeding focused specifically on reform of low-income
assistance programs, the Commission’s emphasis broadened
considerably in its final order, observing:
[T]he best solution for all customers, including low income,
lies in facilitating opportunities to invest in clean energy
and the means to reduce energy costs. Greater access and
support for low income and underserved communities to
DER [distributed energy resources] is the best way to
narrow the affordability gap that needs to be filled with
direct financial assistance for customers with low incomes.
Greater access to advanced energy management products to
increase efficiency for low income customers will empower
those for whom these savings may have the greatest value,
as well as allowing the most disadvantaged customers more
choice in how they manage and consume energy.159
The Commission’s Order goes on to detail several steps it is
already taking to integrate programs to accomplish REV and
156

Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n to Examine Programs to Address
Energy Affordability for Low Income Util. Customers, N.Y. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, No. 14-M-0565, 2016 WL 3018703, at 7 (May 19, 2016) [hereinafter
NY Low Income Order].
157
Id.
158
Id. at 16. The Commission also called for further inquiry into how to
expand eligibility beyond current LIHEAP recipients, but did not make final
recommendations on this point. See id.
159
Id. at 10.
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address energy poverty simultaneously, and it makes a
commitment to further integrate these issues in later phases of the
REV proceeding.160
It is too early to suggest that New York’s Commission has
cracked the nut of how to affirmatively include low-income
consumers in grid modernization efforts. But it is, at least, taking
steps towards concrete proposals—with a particular focus on
including low-income consumers in New York’s new efforts to
promote “community distributed generation” (“CDG”).161 CDG
allows customers to contract for the right to either own or purchase
electricity from larger, community-scale distributed generation
systems, eliminating the need for an appropriate private rooftop to
install small-scale renewable energy.162 The Commission’s first
step towards ensuring the participation of low-income customers in
CDG was to establish a “collaborative” in 2015 to “identify
barriers to low-income customer participation in Community DG
projects and the mechanisms necessary to remove those barriers,”
through a process involving relevant stakeholders.163 That
collaborative resulted in a series of working groups and culminated
in a report issued in August 2016, which identifies numerous
strategies for creating CDG efforts that include substantial
numbers of low-income subscribers.164 These strategies range from
innovative financing arrangements to make participation in CDG
more attainable for low-income customers,165 to state mandates or
160

Id. at 24.
See NYPSC Low-Income Staff Report, supra note 141, at 2.
162
See id. For those projects where community members do not take direct
ownership, “subscriptions can be structured as a power purchase agreement
(PPA), lease, or loan.” Id.
163
Id.
164
See Proceeding on Motion of the Comm’n as to the Policies, Requirements
and Conditions for Implementing a Community Net Metering Programs, N.Y.
Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 15-E-0082 (Summary of the Collaborative Working
Group Reports Regarding Community Distributed Generation for Low-Income
Customers) (Aug. 15, 2016) [hereinafter NY Solar Working Group Report].
165
“Most parties agreed that the major barriers to low-income customer
participation in Community DG projects are the upfront cost of the subscription
and customers’ low credit scores that prevent outside financing.” NY Solar
161
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goals regarding the number of low-income subscribers either
particular projects or the program as a whole should obtain, to
incentive programs targeted specifically at low-income
customers.166
In a contemporaneous August 2016 Status Report, Commission
Staff expressed what reads as at least latent frustration with the
outcomes of this collaborative, explaining: “Although, the
Collaborative spent a great deal of time and effort investigating the
barriers to low-income customer participation in CDG projects,
workable solutions have not arisen that would overcome those
barriers.”167 Accordingly, staff decided to end the collaborative and
produce a staff white paper recommending next steps, which has
yet to be published.168 Presumably, more specific solutions—
including potentially permitting utility ownership of CDG projects
targeting low-income consumers169—will be forthcoming in that
white paper.
It remains important, however, not to focus exclusively on the
(relatively) glamorous option of “solar panels for all.” Often,
programs that focus on strategic cutting of demand, or smarter
targeting of traditional energy efficiency, may better serve lowincome groups and the grid as a whole. To that end, New York’s
Commission is also piloting an effort to allow New York City’s
utility, ConEdison (ConEd), to develop a project focused on
strategies beyond CDG. In the company’s Brownsville Project,
ConEd is developing substantial consumer-side solutions to delay
the need to build expensive sub-transmission infrastructure.170 The
Working Group Report, supra note 164, at 6. To address these challenges, the
Working Group recommended that: “Working in cooperation with Community
Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) or directly with NY Green Bank,
banks could extend credit to a project sponsored for low-income households for
the purpose of subscribing to a Community DG project.” Id. at 9.
166
See id. at 37–39; NYPSC Low-Income Staff Report, supra note 141, at 6.
167
See NYPSC Low-Income Staff Report, supra note 141, at 12.
168
See id.
169
See id. at 13.
170
See Order Establishing Brooklyn/Queens Demand Management Program,
No. 14-E-0302, at 1–5 (N.Y.P.S.C., Dec. 12, 2014) (approving the acquisition of
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project will take place in a high demand, densely residential, lowincome area of Brooklyn and Queens with an above average
proportion of renters as compared to owners.171 Using geo-targeted
data to identify pockets of high peak energy use, ConEd will
provide local residents with energy efficiency, demand
management, distributed generation, apartment complex
microgrids, and “other innovative solutions.”172 ConEd estimates
that the cost of the demand-side solutions will be approximately
$200 million, whereas the traditional transmission solution would
have cost ratepayers $1 billion.173 As a result, the Commission has
agreed to allow ConEd to recover most of the costs of the program
from its ratepayers, and has given the company several additional
incentives.174
There are a few important points to note about New York’s
process and outcome. First, one thing that advocates of grid
modernization often point out when confronted with questions
about its distributive consequences is, “What distributive
consequences? The whole point of grid modernization is it ideally
will make everyone’s bills go down!” This aspiration, standing
alone, is true enough: many analyses suggest that when done
properly and robustly, grid modernization could in fact reduce
overall grid costs and reduce bills across the board.175 But it is
important to understand that this assertion of an eventual hopeful
conclusion does little to assuage the doubts of those who feel the
current system is failing them miserably. They need something far
more than the promise of an eventual minor decrease in electricity

41 megawatts of consumer-side solutions) [hereinafter Demand Management
Program Order].
171
Rebecca Craft, Con Edison’s Use of Targeted Demand-Side Resources,
Presentation to the National Regulatory Research Institute (Feb. 26, 2015).
172
See Demand Management Program Order, supra note 170, at 4; Craft,
supra note 171.
173
Demand Management Program Order, supra note 170, at 19.
174
Id. at 21 (describing additional incentives in the form of a regulated return
of investment, a 10-year amortization period, and opportunities to increase the
return on equity by achieving certain milestones).
175
See supra note 46.
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bills.176 The moment of system re-design opens up the opportunity
for a conversation about how governance reforms might not only
modernize the grid and bring down costs as a general matter, but
also do a better job addressing those whom the current system
under-serves.177 New York’s commission took seriously the
concerns over how energy poverty and grid modernization
interrelate, rather than brushing these aside as irrelevant to a
proceeding that aimed to reduce overall system costs, over the long
term. In doing so, it came to see considerable potential to address
the two issues synergistically, rather than treating them as separate
policy challenges.
Second, there is a procedural as well as substantive lesson to be
learned from New York’s experience: the Commission responded
to the request of those affected by energy poverty to be heard. It is
hard to gauge the extent to which this impacted the ultimate
outcome of the Commission regarding integrating energy poverty
and grid modernization and increasing funding levels.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that it made some impact, given the
movement one can see between the Commission’s opening of the

176

See, e.g., Group Response, supra note 151 (asserting that current programs
“are entirely inadequate to stem the rising number of shutoffs and arrears in
New York. . . . When utility service is shut off because people cannot afford
their bills this mandate is not being met. For many New Yorkers, utility service
is neither reliable, nor are the rates just and reasonable.”). See also Public
Statement Hearing, Proceeding On The Motion Of The Commission To
Examine Programs To Address Energy Affordability For Low Income Utility
Customers, No. 14-M-0565, at 11 (N.Y.P.S.C., Oct. 21, 2015, 3:00 p.m.)
(statement of Russ Haven, Albany 2 transcript) (“Across the board, in all areas,
including this part of the state, there was concern about how REV would affect
utility bills. This can and must mean that consumer ratepayers, particularly lowand moderate-income New Yorkers, end up paying less for electric in the REV
marketplace than in the current system we have now.”).
177
“Under-serves,” at least in the sense that many cannot afford basic utility
service. Whether or not the state should in fact provide such service to them at
discounted rates remains, of course, a matter of substantial academic and
practical debate. But it is hard to quibble with the assertion that electricity is a
pretty basic need at this point in our country, even if one disagrees with whether
or not the state should help provide for it.
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proceeding and the outcomes of its final order.178 At the same time,
it likely served a cathartic function for those who participated,
helping to increase the perceived legitimacy of the Commission’s
ultimate decision.179
V.

NAVIGATING THE TENSIONS

What is to be learned from New York’s experience? There are
obvious epistemological limits to case studies. What mattered in
New York may not matter in other states, as the social context,
interested parties, and governing law may all differ. These
challenges offer real impediments to generalization. Yet New
York’s experience at least serves as a bellwether of tensions likely
to arise in other states, for several reasons. For one, New York is
out ahead of the rest of the country in terms of the magnitude of its
contemplated changes in electricity regulation, but not for long.
Several states are following its lead,180 and many more are likely to
be forced into similar conversations by the sheer scale of structural
and technological changes confronting the electricity industry.181
Moreover, although New York’s particular solutions to the
178

See supra note 156.
See Public Statement Hearing, Proceeding On The Motion Of The
Commission To Examine Programs To Address Energy Affordability For Low
Income Utility Customers, No. 14-M-0565, at 7 (N.Y.P.S.C., Oct. 21, 2015,
3:00 p.m.) (statement of NYPIRG, Albany 2 transcript) (testimony from
representative of New York Public Interest Research Group that “NYPIRG was
among several groups to emphasize to Department staff . . . the central
importance to REV of consumer protections and affordability issues. We were
pleased that the staff clearly heard these concerns. As a result, Chair Zibelman
in turn established regular meetings with the groups and personally met several
times to discuss affordability and consumer protection concerns.”). See
generally Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule
of Law, 30 CRIME & JUST. 283. See also Sovacool & Dworkin, Energy Justice,
supra note 19, at 437 (positing a procedural component to energy justice, contra
projects proceeding “with exclusionary forms of decision-making that lack due
process and representation”).
180
See supra note 21.
181
See Peter Kind, Edison Elec. Inst., Disruptive Challenges: Financial
Implications and Strategic Responses to a Changing Retail Electric Business 6–9
(Jan. 2013).
179
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problem may strike some as particularly “progressive” and thus
limited to areas of deep blue shading on electoral maps, neither its
governance structure nor the challenge it faced is unique: energy
poverty is a pervasive problem across states, and all states use
public utility law to determine how to apportion costs of the grid
among end-use customers.182 Thus, it is likely that as large-scale
grid modernization proceedings unfold across the country,
regulators in all states will be asked to seriously re-engage with the
problem of energy poverty as part and parcel of the push for a
more sophisticated, cleaner grid. Early anecdotal evidence bolsters
this prediction: California’s Commission, another state at the
forefront of modernization efforts, has also engaged in substantial
discussion about the relationship between energy poverty and rate
re-design.183 Similarly, as the European Union has proceeded on its
path towards robust decarbonization, the topic of energy poverty
has emerged as a significant flash point.184
There is not space in this brief article to analyze whether New
York’s response is the best response to such tensions, or how well
182

This statement slightly oversimplifies the case — in the case of the few
states that have moved fully to “retail choice,” public utility law plays a more
limited role. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 57 (describing the three types of
state utility regulation). However, even in states that have moved to competitive
retail electricity markets, the historic utility often continues to serve most
customers as the “provider of last resort,” such that in practice these states’
structural challenges in confronting energy poverty are more similar to
traditional states than may appear at first blush.
183
See NY Solar Working Group Report, supra note 164, at 19 (describing
California’s efforts in this regard); see also Cal. Gov’t Code § 12894 (S.B. 535,
2011–12 Regular Session (Cal. 2012) (adopted Sept. 30. 2012)) (requiring that
twenty-five percent of revenues from the State’s carbon dioxide cap-and-trade
auctions go to projects that benefit identified disadvantaged communities);
Distributed Generation & Distributed Energy Res., D. 06-01-024, 2006 WL
162584, 5, 39–40 (Cal. P.U.C., Jan. 12, 2006) (interim order).
184
Hiteva, supra note 89, at 487 (“The heightened interest in fuel poverty and
vulnerability in Europe is taking place in the background of a low-carbon energy
transition within the European Union.”). See also Sovacool, Fuel Poverty, supra
note 87, at 361 (describing the United Kingdom’s Warm Front Home Energy
Efficiency Scheme, which “removed about 2.36 million English households
from fuel poverty” between 2000 and 2013).
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it would work in other states. Instead, the article aims to draw out
New York’s experience to underscore both a more preliminary and
broader point: the conversation about how to modernize the grid
cannot—as a practical and political endeavor—afford to ignore
either the uncomfortable challenges or substantial ameliorative
possibilities that the project of redesigning electricity governance
and the electricity grid raises for those in energy poverty.
On this point, this article has at moments in this article framed
energy poverty as an “impediment” to grid modernization, and it
certainly can be. In one way, the two issues form a discordant
pairing. But another way to view the increasingly interwoven
nature of these two projects is as an opportunity for reaffirming
energy law’s core commitments in a new era. The fact that
regulators in New York took energy poverty seriously—and
responded substantially to the stories they heard of its effects on
state residents—suggests that regulators there view REV as more
than just a project of finally perfecting the efficiency of the grid.185
Instead, both the re-airing of the problem of energy poverty and the
wholesale re-examination of current electricity governance
structures form part of single, larger project: that of building a
more sustainable, just society, from the grid up.

185

Cf. supra Part II (describing the ways in which grid modernization would
finally bring to fruition the dreams of many energy economists).

